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FOURTH AMENDMENT-ADMINISTRATIVE

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).

Last term, the Supreme Court heard two cases'

involving fourth amendment 2 challenges to warrantless searches and seizures by administative
agencies. 3 In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.,4 the Court
held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act5
was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized agents
of the Secretary of Labor to search employee work
areas for safety hazards without first obtaining
search warrants.6 But the Court also held that
OSHA inspectors need only show that "reasonable

'Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978);
Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S.Ct. 1942 (1978).
2 U.S. Const. amend. IV provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
'In a third case, Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408
(1978), the Court held that a four-day warrantless search
of an apartment in which there had been a murder was
unconstitutional. The Arizona Supreme Court, in State
v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 556 P.2d 273 (1977), had
attempted to establish a rule that a search of a murder
scene does not require a warrant. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court, citing Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S.
Ct. 1942 (1978), held that since residents of a home in
which there has been a murder are presumed innocent,
they retain a recognizable privacy interest. The emergency of a murder may justify an immediate search for
suspects or perishable evidence, but a four-day search is
not justified by the emergency. Here the police had the
apartment well under control and were not in jeopardy
of losing evidence.
The Court concluded that the seriousness of a crime
may not be raised to justify a warrantless search. A
warrantless search will only be justified if obtaining a
warrant would frustrate the purpose of the search.
4 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).

529 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1976).
6 § 657. (a) In order to carry out the purposes of this
chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is
authorized (1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any
factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other
area, workplace or environment where work is performed
by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working
hours and at other reasonable times, and within reason-

legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection 7 had been followed to satisfy
the probable cause requirement of the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment.
In Michigan v. Tyler,8 the Court upheld the admissibility of arson trial evidence that had been
seized from a building during the night of a fire
and shortly thereafter by fire officials acting without search warrants. But, warrantless searches conducted several days later were found to be in
violation of the fourth amendment, 9 and evidence
seized during those searches was held inadmissible
at trial.
Both the Barlow's and Tyler cases dealt with the
fourth amendment problems posed by administrative searches for civil purposes.'0 Administrative
searches have long been used for enforcing health
and safety codes" but have only recently been
subjected to constitutional attack.' 2 These-administrative searches, because of their unique nature,
pose a difficult constitutional problem. For example, many health and safety code violations are not
observable from the outside of a structure, and

able limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place
of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures,
machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials
therein, and to question privately any such employer,
owner, operator, agent or employee.
7 98 S. Ct. at 1824 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
898 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).
9The fourth amendment is applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
'0Civil searches are searches for statutory violations,
generally of health and safety codes, in which the violator
is simply advised of what must be corrected, or assessed
a civil penalty; usually a fine. Civil searches present
problems separate from, though related to, those presented by criminal searches, where the fruits of the search
may lead directly to criminal conviction.
" See 387 U.S. at 548 (Clark, J., dissenting); Frank, 359
U.S. at 367, 368 (1959).
32 Prior to the enactment of OSHA, the federal
government had not engaged in widescale health and safety
inspections. Searches and seizures made pursuant to state
and local inspection programs were not subject to federal
constitutional attack before the fourth amendment was
held applicable to the states in Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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often the owner, due to a lack of expertise, is
unaware of any problems.1 3 The Court has recognized that health and safety codes can be effectively
enforced only through the use of routine periodic
inspections of all structures even where inspectors
have no ,L.picion of a violation in a particular
building. 4 But, inspections such as these do not
easily fit into a constitutional construct.
The fourth amendment permits two types of
searches: warrantless searches that are reasonable,
and searches conducted pursuant to valid warrants.
Warrantless searches are generally held reasonable
only 15 when there are exigent circumstances in
which the delay in obtaining a warrant will frustrate the purpose of the search, or when a person
consents to a search. 6 The Court has held that
many administrative inspections are not hindered
by using search warrants, 7 and people do not
always consent to inspections.' 8 Thus, many administrative searches do not appear to be reasonable under the fourth amendment if conducted
without warrants. Under the fourth amendment,
however, search warrants can only be issued on a
showing of probable cause. Probable cause as applied in criminal searches would require evidence
of a violation in a particular building prior to
conducting an administrative search.' 9 Such a re13Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
Id. at 535-36.

'"

15It is well established that warrantless searches and
seizures are unreasonable under the fourth amendment,
subject to only a few narrowly defined exceptions. The
burden is on the party seeking the exemption tojustify a
warrantless search and seizure. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
16 Some examples of the exigent circumstances principle are: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (frisking a
suspect for dangerous weapons); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (delay would cause
evidence to be lost); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925) (search of an automobile which can rapidly
be moved away); North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure ofunwholesome food).
Some cases discussing the principle of consent are
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
There are a few other minor exceptions where warrantless searches are permitted such as the border search

exception, United States v. Ramsey, 431 US. 606 (1977)
(permitting the opening of international mail suspected
of containing contraband), but none of these excepted
searches is analagous to administrative searches for civil
pu~oses.
I Camara,387 U.S. at 533.

'See 387 U.S. at 552-53 (Clark,J., dissenting).
19There is probable cause for a criminal search when
there is sufficient evidence to justify a reasonable belief

quirement would seriously undermine the effectiveness of health and safety inspection programs.
The Court has recognized that administrative
inspections are vital for maintaining minimal
health and safety standards in a community,20 yet
it is apparent that such searches do not easily
operate under the constitutional restraints that
have been placed on criminal searches. Thus the
court has been reluctant either to declare administrative searches for civil purposes unconstitutional
or to apply to such searches criminal probable
cause requirements. The Court has focused instead
on structuring administrative searches in a way
that will not conflict with the fourth amendment
rights guaranteed to all citizens.
MARSHALL V. BARLOW'S INC.
In Marshallv. Barlow's Inc.,21 an inspector, acting
pursuant to OSHA section 8(a),22 asked to inspect
the working areas of Barlow's Inc., a plumbing and
electrical installation business. The owner refused
to admit the inspector, insisting that the statute's
authorization of a warrantless search violated the
fourth amendment. Three months later, the Secretary of Labor obtained from the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho an order
compelling Barlow to admit the inspector. In response to the order, Barlow brought an action to
enjoin enforcement of the search provisions of
OSHA.
A three-judge district court panel issued a declaratory judgment that the warrantless searches
authorized by OSHA section 8 were in violation of
the fourth amendment and entered an injunction
against any further searches of a similar nature.23
The district court held that the search provisions
of OSHA were analogous to the statutes held unconstitutional in Camarav. Municipal Court24 and See
v. City of Seattle,s and were thus likewise invalid.
26
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision,
affirmed the district court's decision.
that the search will turn up either a suspect or evidence
of a crime. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102
(1965); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959);
Cmrol, 267 US. 132 (1925).
2 387 US. at 535.
21 98 S. CL 1816 (1978).
22 See note 5 supro,

2' Barlow's Inm. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho

1977).
24387 U.S. 523 (1967). See text accompanying note 30

inta.
25 387 U.S. 541 (1967). &ee text accompanying note 35
inf"

24

Justice White wrote the majority opinion, and was
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The Court held that businesses such as Barlow's
Inc. are entitled to fourth amendment protection
from civil searches. The Court first looked to the
historical development of the fourth amendment
during the Revolutionary War and noted that the
framers of the Constitution intended to protect
both businesses and private residences from abusive
criminal and civil searches.27 The warrantless civil
search of Barlow's Inc. was therefore unconstitutional unless it fit into "some recognized exception
to the warrant requirement." ' ss
In determining whether OSHA inspections are
a proper subject for warrantless searches, the Court
had four prior2 cases involving administrative
searches to look to for guidance.30 In one of these,
joined by Justices Powell, Stewart, Marshall and Chief
Justice Burger. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion,

joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice
Brennan did not take part in the decision.
Judging by his past voting record, it appears quite
certain that had Justice Brennan taken part in the decision he would have voted with the majority. Justice
Brennan dissented in Frank, 359 U.S. 360, and voted with
the majority in Camara, 387 U.S. 523 and See, 387 U.S.
541. The position he took in these three cases is quite
similar to the majority's position in Barlow's. Thus the
holding of the majority in Barlow's probably has the
support of six Justices..

The historical interpretation of the fourth amendment has been a disputed topic. In Frank, 359 U.S. at
363-67, the Court read the history of the amendment's
enactment as indicating that the framers were primarily
concerned with abusive searches in criminal cases. The
Court held that warrantless searches were constitutional
in administrative areas since civil searches touched "at
most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment's protection
against official intrusion." Id. at 367.
Frank was overruled in Camara, 287 U.S. 523, where
the Court interpreted the fourth amendment as establishing a broad-based protection against not only criminal
searches, but all official invasions of privacy.
In Barlow's the Court adopted the historical point of
view taken in Camara. The Court noted that the general
warrants issued to search businesses to insure compliance
with revenue acts, such as the Stamp Act of 1765, were
particularly offensive to the colonists. Thus the framers
of the Constitution were reacting against abusive civil
searches of businesses as well as against abusive criminal
searches. 98 S.Ct. at 1819-20.
2898 S.Ct. at 1820.
29United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72
(1970); See, 387 U.S. 541; Camara, 387 U.S. 523.
" The first case involving administrative searches for
a civil purpose was Frank, 359 U.S. 360, in which the
Court upheld warrantless searches authorized by the
Baltimore city code for the purpose of discovering health
hazards. The case was overruled in Camara, 387 U.S. at
528 (1967).
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Camara v. Municipal Court,3 a private citizen was
charged with violating the San Francisco housing
code3 2 after refusing to allow a city inspector to
enter his home without a search warrant. The

Court overturned the search provision of the housing code and held that a search warrant was required.
The fourth amendment requires that search warrants only be issued upon a showing of probable
cause. And, probable cause as previously defined
in relation to criminal searches permits searches
only where there is evidence of a violation in a
particular building.33 The Camara Court recognized that the success of health and safety codes
depends upon routine periodic inspections without
any evidence of a violation, so it established for
civil administrative searches a lower standard of
probable cause based on the reasonableness of the
inspection." A judge could find probable cause
sufficient to issue a warrant for a health or safety
inspection if "reasonable legislative or administra-

tive standards for conducting an area inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling. ' ' ss This would satisfy the public need for
conducting an area-based search as well as assure
the private citizen that the government was acting
reasonably.
3
In Camara'scompanion case, See v.City ofSeattle,

the Court used the same principles to judge the
validity of city fire inspections of a commercial
building, although the Court did note that there
may be instances when the fourth amendment
would tolerate greater intrusions on businesses than
on private residences. But three years later, in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,3 7 the Court

made an abrupt change by establishing a category
of administrative searches that did not require
:" 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
3 The inspection was conducted pursuant to the San
Francisco Housing Code § 503.

33See note 18 supra.
34This was an unprecedented concept offered by the
Court. The Camara Court held that "if a valid public

interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is
probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." 387 U.S. at 539. The only authority cited for this
proposition is Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
372 U.S. 186 (1946), where search warrants for generalized Congressional investigations were permitted. But the
warrant there had to state specific documents that related "
to the investigation, whereas in Camarano suspicion that
the particular house to be searched contained any violations was required. '
35 387 U.S. at 528.
36 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
37 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
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search warrants at all. The Colonnade Court upheld
a federal statuteF4 that had permitted a fine to be
imposed on a retail liquor dealer who had refused
to allow agents of the Secretary of Labor to make
a warrantless search of his store. The Court based
its opinic: cn language in See that reserved the
question of warrantless searches in heavily regulated or licensed industries for a case-by-case determination under the reasonableness standard of the
fourth amendment. The Court held that since the
liquor industry has had a long history of licensing
and regulation, warrantless searches in that industry can be constitutional.
The Court furthered the notion of warrantless
administrative searches in United States v. Biswell,39
which involved the search of the store of a gun
dealer licensed under the Gun Control Act of
1968."0 The Biswell Court held that gun control
was an important part of crime prevention and
that since frequent surprise inspections were crucial
to successful gun control, "inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable official conduct
under the fourth amendment." 41 See was distinguished on the grounds that the building defects
could not be concealed during the period of delay
caused by the necessity of obtaining warrants. On
the other hand, the guns in Biswell could be easily
hidden.
In reviewing these four cases, the Barlow's Court
held that Camara and See established the basic
principles for administrative searches and that Colonnade and Biswell were the exceptions. The Court
read Colonnade and Biswell as establishing a narrow
exception to the fourth amendment involving only
heavily regulated and licensed industries. A businessman operating in these fields "must already be
aware" of the high degree of governmental supervision, and searches were seen as just one of the
"burdens" of doing business. 42 This "awareness"
amounted to an implied consent to a lowering of
the privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment. The Court reasoned, however, that since
OSHA regulations cover virtually all industries
affecting interstate commerce, "nothing but the
most fictional sense of voluntary consent to later
searches' "A could be found. OSHA simply covered
too many areas to fit into the Colonnade/Biswell
exception to the warrant requirement.
- 26 U.S.C. §§ 5146(b), 7606, 7342 (1976).
311 (1972).
4o 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976).
41406 U.S. at 316.
4298 S. Ct. at 1821.
43
Id
"9406 U.S.

The Barlow's Court also recognized a general
reasonableness exception to the fourth amendment
where the need for a warrantless search outweighs
the incremental protection a warrant would afford
the subject of the search. The government had
argued that surprise inspections are crucial to
OSHA's success and that if inspectors have to wait
to obtain warrants, many defects will be hidden.
In the alternative, if OSHA inspectors decide not
to risk being refused entrance to a work area, they
will have to obtain search warrants prior to every
inspection, which would result in a heavy burden
on both OSHA and the courts.
The Court rejected both of these arguments,
primarily on the basis that most businessmen could
be expected to consent to warrantless searches."
The Court further observed that the Secretary of
Labor's own OSHA regulations demonstrated that
when an inspector was refused entry, the department intended to seek compulsory process rather
than bring criminal charges.' 5 The former was the
procedure actually used in Barlow's case.
The Barlow's Court felt that the process of obtaining search warrants after an inspector is refused
entry would not diminish OSHA's effectiveness.
Further, the Court held that the Camara standard
of probable causes was appicable, so that OSHA
inspectors would be able to obtain warrants upon
a showing that:
[a] specific business has been chosen for an OSHA
search on the basis of a general administrative plan
for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral
sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees
in various types of industries across a given area, and
the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser
divisions of the area.... 47
The government had argued that a warrant
based on such minimal grounds will in actuality
"The Court noted that since the Secretary of Labor
had not demonstrated that a pattern of widespread refusal existed, the Court can only "await the development
of evidence" in this area. Id at 1822 n.1 1.
45 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1977) states that if an inspector
is refused entrance he shall "immediately consult with
the Assistant Regional Director and the Regional Solicitor, who shall promptly take appropriate action, including compulsory process, if necessary."
This action was chosen by the Secretary even though
criminal proceedings were possible in the same situation;
18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) makes it a crime to impede or
interfere with a federal officer.
"See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
47 98 S. Ct. at 1825.
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be little more than a rubber stamp that will give
businessmen no real protection from governmental
intrusions. However, the Court responded that a
search warrant of this type would give the businessman judicial assurance that the inspections
were constitutional, authorized by statute, and pursuant to a rational plan of enforcement. The warrants would in addition provide information as to
the proper scope of the search. If no warrant was
required, a businessman wishing to challenge the
validity of a search in court had to risk possible
criminal sanctions.
Justice Stevens' dissent" argued that warrantless
searches conducted pursuant to OSHA do not
violate the fourth amendment. He asserted that
the fourth amendment provides a twofold protection against searches and seizures. The first half of
the amendment is a general prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, while the second half prohibits the issuance of search warrants
in the absence of the probability of locating evidence or suspects.
Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens read the
history of the Revolutionary War as indicating
that the fourth amendment arose in part as a
response to the Crown's issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance under which nearly
anyone's home could be searched. The requirement
that a warrant be issued only on probable cause
was adopted by the framers of the Constitution
specifically to circumscribe the warrant power. Justice Stevens asserted that the majority had attempted to force inspections into a warrant scheme,
thereby diluting the framers' intent behind the
warrant clause of the fourth amendment. Stevens
concluded that the warrant clause has no application to routine health and safety inspections. If
there is justification for such programs, it must be
under the first half of the fourth amendment which
permits reasonable searches and seizures.
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that
balancing the public interest against a citizen's
fourth amendment privacy interest is the proper
method for determining the reasonableness of a
warrantless search and seizure. 49 But Justice Stevens preferred to defer as much as possible to
48 Justice Stevens was joined in his dissent by Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist.
49 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (highway checkpoint near Mexican border searching for illegal immigxants); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976) (routine inventory of an impounded
car revealed narcotics); Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972);
Terry, 392 U.S. I (frisking a suspect for dangerous
weapons).
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Congressional judgment as to the proper balance
between such interests. He simply did not find the
majority's50 reasoning powerful enough to override
Congress.

The majority in Barlow's did not deal with the
effects of its own ruling. 5' However, Justice Stevens
asserted that the number of refusals will rise significantly due to the decision in this case and that
this will create a dilemma for OSHA inspectors:
they can either risk fruitless visits by not obtaining
warrants or waste time securing warrants prior to
all searches as a matter of routine. Either option
will cause delay and inefficiency in enforcing the
OSHA regulations.
Justice Stevens then attacked the majority's reliance on the Secretary of Labor's regulations as
evidence that obtaining warrants will not burden
OSHA inspectors.52 The regulations, he asserted,
were issued on the assumption that warrantless
searches were legal and that refusals to cooperate
would be minimal. But, according to Stevens, the
Barlow's decision undermines that basic assumption. Stevens charged that the Court's reliance on
the Secretary's regulations as evidence indicated its
discomfort "with the notion of second guessing
Congress and the Secretary on the question of how
the substantive goals of OSHA can best be
achieved.ss
Additionally, Justice Stevens found merit in the
government's argument that what little protection
administrative search warrants will afford businessmen is already built into the statute. An administrative search warrant, he noted, will purportedly inform the employer that the inspection
is authorized by statute, designate the lawful limits
of the search, and assure the employer that the
person demanding entry is an authorized inspector.
But, in his view, since the lowered probable cause
requirement will require a judge to do little more
than approve an administrative inspection schedule drawn up by Labor Department officials, the
search warrant will oifer no added assurance that
the inspection is lawful. The proper limits of an
OSHA irlspection, he said, are laid out in the
statute,5 and the reviewing judge will not narrow
these in any way. As to the inspector's credentials,
5098 S. Ct. at 1829 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5'In 98 S. Ct at 1822 n. II
the majority recognized the
possible effect of its ruling but noted that it could not

deal with evidence not in the record.
52 98 S.Ct. at 1829-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98 S.Ct. at 1829.
5429 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1), (a)(2) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §
1903 (1977).
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the statute requires an inspector to present them
prior to a search, and the businessman is entitled
to a toll-free call to verify them.55 Those businessmen who refuse an inspection will learn little from
the warrant they receive when the inspector returns.
Justice Stevens then cited United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,56 as an example of a reasonable warrantless search. There, the Court upheld the constitutionality of warrantless searches of automobiles
for illegal aliens conducted at permanent checkpoints on highways north of the Mexican border.
No probable cause was required to search a vehicle
since this would have thwarted the efficiency of the
program. Similarly, an administrative search warrant was not required because the permanent nature of the checkpoint was held to be sufficient
assurance that the police were properly authorized.
Noting the majority's broad deference to
Congressional judgment in the Colonnade and Biswell cases, Stevens next pointed out that the Court's
distinguishing of these cases based on the notion of
a long history of regulation is not a valid method
for determining when Congressionally authorized
searches are reasonable. According to Stevens, such
reasoning would mean that Congress could never
adapt to changing circumstances. He attacked the
notion of consent, noting that it is purely fictional
and based solely on a businessman's awareness of
governmental regulations concerning his business.
And, since he believed the validity of a regulation
to be based on the existence of a proper statute, he
stated that the validity of a search should be based
on a determination of how necessary it is to fulfill
the goals of a regulatory statute.
Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the majority
actually demonstrated a preference for legislation
on an industry-by-industry basis as opposed to the
broad-based inspection provisions in OSHA.5 He
argued that the scope of a statute should not
determine the constitutionality of the searches it
authorizes. As long as the "power to inspect ...is
tailored to the subject matter,"' 8 the search is
reasonable under the fourth amendment- Justice
' Although Justice Stevens asserted the right of a toll
free call unequivocally, this right has been recognized in
only one prior court opinion, and there was no mention
of the call's being toll free. Usery v. Godfrey Brake and
Su~ply Service Inc, 545 F.2d 52,54 (8th Cir. 1976).
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
5 In Colonnade the statute covered the liquor industry,
and in Biswell the statute covered gun dealers. OSHA,

on the other hand, covers all employers with businesses
affecting interstate commerce.
0 98 S. Ct. at 1833 (Stevens, J, dissenting).

Stevens thus asserted that the OSHA search provisions were just as well-designed for discovering
health and safety violations as the Colonnade and
Biswell search provisions were for uncovering violations of the respective statutes in those cases.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Barlow's seem to have acknowledged the importance of health and safety inspection programs, 59
and both sides seem to have agreed that civil
inspection programs cannot be run successfully if
the inspectors have to present evidence that a
probable violation exists in a particular building
prior to conducting a search. The disagreement
arises as to the necessity of permitting warrantless
searches as opposed to requiring search warrants
based on the lower standard of probable cause.
The government had argued that warrantless
searches were justified by the need for surprise
searches. And, the majority refuted this by pointing
out that inspectors could obtain ex parte warrants
prior to any search that required an element of
surprise. The only reply that the government could
offer to this notion was that the warrant procedure
would cause an administrative burden. But, the
Court has held that efficiency alone is not a sufficient ground for disregarding the fourth amendment.wo Moreover, OSHA officials will have no
problem obtaining search warrants under the lower
standard of probable cause. Ninety-five percent of6
OSHA's work involves dangerous industries '
where the nature of the industry itself would probably be sufficientjustification for an administrative
search warrant. OSHA officials seemed to recognize this, for soon after the Barlow'sdecision, OSHA
issued an order instructing inspectors to seek search
warrants promptly if refused entry for inspection.6
The main issue then appears to be whether the
administrative search warrant will be a rubber
stamp and thus a needless waste of time. In dissent,
Justice Stevens argued that the statute offers the
same protections as the search warrant. Yet, this
argument ignores one of the main purposes of a
search warrant, the interposition of a neutral judicial authority between the government and a
citizen before his privacy can be invaded.63 The
' For a good statistical analysis of the importance of
such inspectign programs, see 387 U.S. at 550-52 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
wMicqy, 98 S. CL at 2214; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481.
U.S. at 481.
'The New York Times, May 24, 1978, § D at 21, col.
3.
62Id, June 4, 1978 § I(news) at 53, col. 4.
Johnsorn v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
The Court there held that although the evidence of a
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statute does not provide any means of preventing
OSHA officials from abusing the search provisions.6 A search warrant will provide judicial assurance that a search is part of a legitimate inspection program.
In Barlow's, the Court was faced with the difficult
task of trying to preserve the effectiveness of OSHA
inspections without violating fourth amendment
protections against official intrusions. The warrant
system based on the lower standard of probable
cause for civil inspections appears to be the only
logical solution. In an increasingly crowded and
industrialized society, the number of health and
safety inspections will probably increase, and citizens will need some protection from potentially
abusive searches. The search warrant based on the
lower standard of probable cause will afford the
government a great deal of flexibility and at the
same time prevent most abusive searches. While
Justice Stevens may be correct that historically, the
probable cause requirement was intended to prevent generalized warrants, the Constitution must
be flexible enough to adapt to new situations and
new problems.
The one problem, however, with the Barlow's
decision was its attempt to distinguish the warrantless searches permitted in the Colonnade and
Biswell cases. The decisions in those cases relied
heavily on the need for surprise searches, but the
Barlow's Court was not able to cite this as grounds
for distinguishing those cases, since the need for
surprise searches had been rejected in Barlow's as a
justification
for warrantless
administrative
searches. The Court instead attempted to distinguish Colonnade and Biswell based on the notion of
implied consent.' The Court held that because of
crime would probably have been sufficient for a search
warrant, the police can not act on their own.
6In
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948),
the Court noted that police officers engaged on the oftencompetitive enterprise of crime detection are not properly
suited forjudging when a situation warrants an invasion
of a citizen's privacy. OSHA officials may be subject to
similar pressures.
6This was an unprecedented concept offered by the
Court. See Bumper, 391 U.S. 543; Katz, 389 U.S. 347;
Lewis, 386 U.S. 206 (1966). In Bumper, the Court held
that permitting a search when a police officer presents a
search warrant did not constitute consent when the warrant later turned out to be invalid. In Katz, the Court
held a wiretap of a phonebooth conversation unconstitutional because the person expected his words to be
private. In Lewis, the Court held that a person who sold
narcotics to an undercover narcotics agent in his home
consented to the seizure of the narcotics.
In all of the above cases, the Court required voluntary
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the high degree of regulation, the owners of gun
and liquor stores in those cases impliedly consent
to searches and thus search warrants are not required. But this is a confusing concept as the owner
of a heavily regulated business has no more desire
to permit searches of his premises than does an
employer covered by OSHA. The fact that a business is subjected to a high degree of governmental
regulation may increase the public need for inspections, but it is difficult to see how this lowers the
owner's fourth amendment privacy interest. However, given the factual similarity among the statutes
in Barlow's, Colonnade, and Biswell, it appears that
the Court is actually strictly limiting the Colonnade
and Biswell cases to their facts. Those two decisions
are still valid precedents for warrantless administrative searches, but the Court in light of Barlow's,
will probably be very cautious in using them in the
future."
MICHIGAN V. TYLER

In Michigan v. Tyler, a fire had broken out at
midnight in a store owned by the defendant and a
business partner. Approximately two hours later,
the fire chief arrived and began to search the
premises to determine the cause of the fire.68 After
discovering two plastic containers of flammable
liquid, the chief concluded that arson may have
been the cause of the fire, so he called a police

consent to a specific search. There is no precedent for the
notion of implied consent to searches other than Biswell.
66There may soon be an indication of the extent of
the Colonnade/Biswell type exception. The Supreme Court
recently vacated and remanded to the Fifth Circuit two
cases in light of Barlow's and Tyler. 98 S. Ct. 2841. These
two cases, United States v. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States v.
Mississippi Power and Light, 553 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1977)
both involve an executive order that permits warrantless
searches of the records of certain public contractors to
insure compliance with federal non-discrimination requirements. The cases involve public utilities which have
a long history of regulation similar to the gun and liquor
industries in Colonnade and Biswell. The Fifth Circuit
vacated and remanded the cases to the district court for
further consideration. United States v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 557 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Mississippi Power and Light, 553 F.2d 480. If
these cases reach the Supreme Court again they should
provide an excellent opportunity for the Court to clarify
the nature of the Colonnade/Biswell exception.
6798 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).
68The Court says that it is the fire chief's "job" to
determine the origin of all fires that occur within the
township. Id. at 1946. It is unclear if this duty is statutory
or customary.
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detective. The detective arrived at approximately
three-thirty in the morning, entered the building
with the fire chief, and took several pictures. At
around four o'clock, smoke and steam made further
investigation impossible, so the fire chief and the
detective Ic .e 1dup the building and left.69 The fire
chief returned for a quick examination the next
morning and then returned with the detective later
in the day for a further investigation into the cause
of the fire. At this time several pieces of evidence of
arson were found. Approximately three weeks later,
several other searches were made and further evidence of arson was discovered. All of the searches
were made without search warrants.
Tyler and a co-defendant were tried for conspiracy to burn real property,70 and Tyler was tried
individually for burning real property7 ' and burning real property with the intent to defraud. 72 The
defendants challenged the evidence gathered during all of the searches as constitutionally inadmissible since the police and fire officials did not use
search warrants. But, both defendants were convicted on all counts, and the convictions were
upheld on first appeal.7"
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed all of the
convictions, 74 holding that although a fire is an
emergency that permits public officials to enter a
building without a search warrant, when the
fire-and thus the emergency-had ended, by four
a.m. there was no justification for. the warrantless
searches. Since no consent had been obtained for
the searches, all of the evidence gathered during
them was held inadmissible. The United States
Supreme Court upheld the reversal of the convictions but modified the state court's holding to allow
admission of the evidence obtained in searches the
morning after the fire. 75
The state of Michigan argued that the owner of
a building in which there has been a recent fire
has no expectation of privacy. If the owner set the
blaze, then he has abandoned his fourth amend69 Although there was still smoke and steam, the fire
had been put out. At four a.m. all of the firefighters left
also.
70
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.157a (Mich. Stat. Ann. §
28.354(1) (Callaghan 1978)).
73Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.73 (Mich. Stat. Ann. §
28.268 (Callaghan 1972)).
7 Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.75 (Mich. Stat. Ann. §
28.270 (Callaghan 1972)).
73 People v. Tyler, 50 Mich. App. 414, 213 N.W.2d 221
(1973).
74People v. Tyler, 399 Mich. 564, 250 N.W.2d 467
(1977).
75 Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).

ment privilege, the state argued, and if he is a
victim of a fire, then fire officials treat him as a
victim and enter the building only to aid in discovering the cause of the fire.
However, the Court 6 rejected this argument,
first establishing that commercial premises are entitled to protection from searches for criminal or
civil purposes. When there has been a fire in a
building one must assume that the owner is innocent, and even if most innocent victims of fires
have little privacy interest in the damaged building, those who do have a recognizable privacy
interest. Thus property damaged by fire is no
exception to the general rule that "except in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."77
The State had also argued that since the fact
that there had been a fire would automatically
satisfy the probable cause requirement for an administrative search warrant, the warrant would not
even serve the Barlow's-typepurpose of assuring the
owner that the inspection was part of a rational
administrative plan. The Court rejected the argument that all fire searches are identical, pointing
out that a judge would be abie to consider the
purpose of the search, its scope, how many prior
searches had been made, and any other factors in
order to insure that "harassment" 78 of the owner is
kept to a minimum. The Court also pointed out
that although a fire probably justifies a search, an
owner has no way of knowing the limits or purpose
of such a search if a fire official is not forced to
present a warrant.
The Court set up a double standard for the type
of warrant necessary to carry out a search. If the
search is for the sole purpose of discovering the
cause of the fire so as to prevent possible reoccurrence, then the probable cause standard developed
for civil searches in Camarav. Municipal Court would
be appropriate. But as soon as the authorities begin
to seek evidence for a criminal prosecution,7 the
usual standards of probable cause will apply. 9
Since an owner of a building that has been
76The opinion of the Court was written by Justice
Stewart, and was joined by Justice Powell and Chief
Justice Burger.
7 98 S. Ct. at 1948 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).
7898 S. Ct. at 1949.

79d at 1949-50. Since all of the searches were made
without warrants, the Court did not address the issue of
what warrants would have been proper under the circumstances.
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destroyed by a fire is still entitled to fourth amendment protection; the Court held that warrantless
searches are justifiable if they fit into one of the
narrow categories of action where there is no time
to wait for a search warrant. According to the
Court, burning buildings clearly fit into this category, and fire fighters are thus allowed to enter the
scene of a fire without first obtaining a search
warrant. The Court also held that once inside a
building, firemen may seize evidence of arson that
is in plain view; thus the seizures by the fire chief
and the detective while the fire still continued
during the first early morning search, were constitutional even without a search warrant.
The Court also found that the Michigan Supreme Court's holding that the exigency permitting warrantless searches ends with the last flame
was too narrow. Fire officials are charged with
finding the cause of a fire so as to prevent any
reoccurrence, and this often requires a careful examination of the premises. There would have been
no purpose in forcing the fire chief and the detective to stay in the building while the smoke cleared,
so the Court held that officials do not need a
warrant to search a building during a fire and for
a reasonable time afterwards.80 The Court placed
no importance on the fact that the fire chief and
the detective physically left the building, because
all of their actions were part of the same investigation. The Court held that all entries after the
fire's expiration were detached from the initial
emergency and deserving of fourth amendment
protection. Thus all evidence gathered during those
searches should have been inadmissible at trial.
Justice Stevens agreed with the judgment of the
Court that the searches up until the next morning
required no search warrants. But, as in Barlow's, he
again took issue with the majority's notion of an
administrative search warrant."' A warrant authorizes an unannounced entry by force, and, absent suspicion of a crime or any special enforcement
need, Justice Stevens saw no need to trigger "an
abrupt and preemptory challenge between sovereign and citizen. ' 82 He thus proposed a system in
which the government would notify citizens in
advance of any administrative search, thereby affording the citizen the chance to challenge the
80 98 S. Ct. at 1950. In footnote 6 the Court points out
that this reasonable time will vary depending upon the
type of building and the needs of the owner.
"' This is the same position that he took in Barlow's, 98
S. Ct. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
898 S. Ct at 1952.
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search in court.83 Since under this system the fire
official would have to notify the owner of a building prior to any searches after the emergency has
ended, Justice Stevens was able to concur in the
judgment excluding evidence gathered in searches
the day of the fire.
Justice Blackmun joined in the judgment of the
Court but only concurred in parts I, III, and IV-A
of the opinion.84 This is extremely difficult to interpret since part IV-B simply says that all searches
conducted after the date of the fire were warrantless and not based on consent, thus any evidence
gathered in them must be excluded. If one disagrees
with this it is difficult to see how one could concur
in the judgment. Justice Blackmun would not join
in parts II and V because they espouse the concept
of an administrative search warrant based on the
lower standard of probable cause.8
Justice White concurred&' with most of the
Court's judgment but dissented from overruling
the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that the
exigency that permitted a warrantless search ended
at the time the fire was extinguished. White asserted that if the firemen were able to leave the
building and lock it up for four hours, clearly the
exigent circumstances had terminated. He pointed
out that fire officials will need more carefullydrawn guidelines than those outlined in the majority opinion, so he would insist on a warrant for all
searches after the fire has been put out. Thus, he
would have excluded evidence gathered from all of
the searches
conducted on the morning after the
7
fire.
3 The only authority cited for this proposed inspection
system is a law review article that notes a similar procedure with administrative subpoenas in the United States,
and health inspections in England, whereby the government agency gives the citizen notice of the impending
action. LaFave, AdministrativeSearches and the FourthAmendment: The Camaraand See Cases, 1967 THE Sup. CT. REV. 1,
31-32, (Kurland, ed.).
&3Part I gives the facts, Part II establishes the need for
administrative warrants in fire inspections, Part III held
that fires are an exception permitting warrantless
searches during the actual fire, Part IV-A held that the
searches up until the next morning were constitutional,
Part IV-B held that all of the other searches were unconstitutional, and Part V summarized the holding in the
case.
85 Maintaining this same position in Barlow's, Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Stevens' dissent. 98 S. Ct. at
1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86Justice White was joined by Justice Marshall.
87 Justice White also noted the state court's factual
finding that the searches on the morning of January 22
were for the purpose of collecting evidence for a criminal
prosecution. 98 S. Ct. at 1953-54. This would imply that
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Justice Rehnquist dissented from the entirejudgment on the grounds that no warrants were required for any of the searches. He noted that the
building was damaged beyond use and that Tyler
gave no indication of an intent to repair and use
the building Tyler never objected to the searches;
in fact, he even accompanied the police and fire
officials on some of them and once suggested that
the fire might have been caused by arson. Justice
Rehnquist felt that since the searches were reasonable, they did not constitutionally require search
warrants.
All eight justices involved in the decision agreed
that a fire official may search the premises of a fire
without a warrant during the course of a fire. One
justice 2 would extend this privilege indefinitely,
five 9 would allow it to continue for a reasonable
time after the fire, and two92 would end the privilege as soon as the flames are quenched. As to
administrative search warrants, five91 favored them
being required after the fire for civil searches and
three92 denied their validity. Thus at least five
justices concurred on the three main points of the
decision: no warrants during a fire, no warrants for
a reasonable time afterwards, and administrative
search warrants for all searches after the reasonable
time.
In Tyler, one can see an application of the principles developed for administrative searches in Barlow's. The Tyler Court held that a fire is a civil
emergency that permits a warrantless search. The
need for immediate action to bring the fire under
control and discover its cause was considered to
outweigh the privacy interest of the property
owner. After the emergency has ended, however,
the usual requirements for searches apply. If the
post-emergency search is for the civil purpose of
discovering the cause of the fire, the lower standard
of probable cause applies; but if the search is for

evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, then
the strict standard of probable cause must be met.
It is interesting to note that the Tyler Court
implicitly rejected the principle of implied consent
developed in Barlow's in the context of a fire. The
State of Michigan had argued that the owner of
property destroyed by a fire has no recognizable
privacy interest since he is either an arsonist or a
victim of a fire. This argument gave the Court a
perfect opportunity to extend the notion of implied
consent as it could have held that the owner of a
building destroyed by a fire impliedly consents to
searches by public officials to determine the cause
of the fire. The extent of the damage done by a fire
might have been seen as analogous to the degree of
governmental regulation of business which was
held to imply consent to searches in Colonnade and
Biswell The Tyler Court, however, rejected this line
of reasoning and held that the fact that most peoph.
would welcome an inspection of their property
after a fire "is irrelevant to the question of whether
the... inspection is reasonable within the meaning
of the fourth amendment." 9 The few property
owners who would object to such searches retain
the full protection of the fourth amendment.
Tyler also illustrates the problems that the administrative search warrant will cause in the future.
The Tyler decision leads to the anomalous situation
in which different search warrants are required
depending upon the motivation of the public official conducting the search. The line between civil
and criminal searches will be difficult to draw, and
such a situation provides an opportunity for an
overzealous public official to lie about the purpose
of a search. Another problem will arise when criminal evidence is accidently discovered during a civil
search. Admitting such evidence at trial would
seriously undermine the protection given by the
probable cause requirement of the warrant clause
in criminal cases."4

the searches were unconnected with the initial emergency
and actually the start of a criminal investigation. '
8.Justice Rehnquist. 98 S. Ct. at 1954 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
98 S. Ct. at 1951 (Burger, C.J., Stewart, PowellJJ.);
Id at 1952 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id at 1953 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90 98 S. Ct. at 1953 (Marshall, White, JJ., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
' 98 S. Ct. at 1951 (Burger, C.J., Stewart, PowellJJ.);
Id at 1953 (Marshall, White, JJ., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
9298 S. Ct. at 1954 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); d at
1952 (Blackmun,J., concurring); rd at 1952 (StevensJ.,
concurring).

9398 S. Ct. at 1948 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. at 526).
f The Supreme Court may soon rehear a case involving a similar problem. United States v. Consolidation
Coal, 560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977), involves the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §
801 etseq. (1976). This statute has a search provision
similar to OSHA's except that if evidence of a wilfull
violation of the statute's provisions is found, there are
criminal sanctions.
Government agents, informed of a wilfull violation,
proceeded to conduct a search of six company offices
which yielded evidence that resulted in criminal convictions- Although the warrants were based on the lower
standard of probable cause used for administrative
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the Court reaffirmed the holding of Camara in
it was established that warrants would be
which
In the Barlow's and Tyler cases, the Court estabfor all administrative searches except in a
required
lished a structure for requiring administrative
cases. These exceptions will
narrowly-defined
few
search warrants that parallels the structure involvsuch as the fire
circumstances
exigent
on
based
be
ing criminal search warrants, but that is based on
in Tyler or on some notion of consent as in Colonnade
a different standard of probable cause. In Barlow's,
and Biswell. It appears that as in criminal searches,
the party seeking the exemption from the fourth
searches, the court held them sufficient for all searches,
amendment will carry a heavy burden of proof.
civil or criminal, authorized by the statute.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case
The Court had set up a conflict by requiring
in light of Barlow's and Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 2841. On remand, search warrants in Camara and See and yet permitthe circuit court upheld its original decision. United
in Colonnade and Biswell.
States v. Consolidation Coal, 579 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. ting warrantless searches
1978). This appears to ignore the Tyler holding that By resolving this conflict, Barlow's will probably
requires the application of the strict criminal standards become the basic precedent for all future adminof probable cause if the purpose of the search is the istrative search cases. The importance of Tyler lies
discovery of evidence for a criminal prosecution. If this
in its indication that the Court intends a strict
case reaches the Supreme Court again, it will provide an
to the separate standards established for
adherence
excellent opportunity for a clarification of the line sepacivil and criminal searches.
rating criminal from civil searches.
CONCLUSION

